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[Sac. No. 6892.

In Bank.

Jan. 29, 1960.]

ADOLPH D. LAUX et a1., Respondents, v. WILLIAM J.
FREED et a1., Appellants.
[1] Easements-Kinds of Easements: Oreation-By Severance of

Tenements.-The principle embodied in Civ. Code, § 1104, declaring what easements pass with property, and its application are not limited to the list of servitudes and corresponding
easements enumerated in Civ. Code, § 801, since the easements
encompassed within § 1104 embrace every burden which by
virtue of the manner of use has been imposed on the portion
of the estate not granted in favor of the portion granted.
[2] Id. -Mode and Extent of User. - Where it affirmatively appeared from the evidence that, from the time the parties
as partners first acquired range land until they divided
it by the flip of a coin some five years later and erected a boundary fence the following year, both plaintiff (the winner of the
northern portion) and defendant (who received the southern
portion) and their invitees and guests had hunted the entire
range land and during a portion of that time had jointly leased
out the deer hunting rights on a commercial basis, and that,
until plaintiff partner won the toss of the coin and knew that
the northern portion would be his, his interest was that the

[2) See Oal.Jur.2d, Easements, § 23 et seq.; Am..Jur., Easements,
§ 112 et seq.
Melt. Dig. References: [1] Easements, §§ 3, 16; [2] Easementl5,
§ 29; [3-5] Partnership, § 36; [6, 8] Easements, § 14; [7] Deeds,
§ 175; [9] Contracts, § 153; [10-12] Easements, § 34.
• Alllrigned b,. Chairman of Judicial Council.
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party who receh'ed the other portion (the back half or "brush
patch") should likewise receive an unlimited right of way over
the private acc£ss road from the northern to the southern portion, and where both parcels and the deeded right of way over
the road continued to be used for deer hunting for some four
yellrs after the partnership dissolution, after which plaintiff
complained that "these people coming across interfered with
the hunting .on" his own parcel after the partition, and for that
reason tardily sought to have a court write into the deed which
he had prepared limitations on the use of his former partner
which he asserted were discussed but were omitted from the
deed, the provisions of Civ. Code, § 1104, should apply in favor
of defendant to the end that he be permitted to continue the
full use of the right of way in the manner it was used before
partition of the property.

•

[3] Partnership-Relations Between Partners-Fiduciary Relation.
-As partners in the ownership and operation of the entire
range property before it was divided, plaintiff and defendant
bore a confidential and fiduciary relationship to each other.
Neither had the right to take unfair advantage or secure an
undue bcnefit, and the burden is on the one seeking an advantage to show complete good faith and fairness toward the other.
[4] Id.-Relations Between Partners-Fiduciary Relation.-The
duty of good faith required of partners and the burden of showing it extend to the dissolution and liquidation of partnership
affairs, as well as to the sale by one partner to another of his
interest in the partnership.
[5] Id. - Relations Between Partners - Fiduciary Relation. - If
plaintiff partner, who drafted the right of way deed on partition of range land into two pOl·tions following dissolution of
the pUl·tnership, intended that use of such right of way be
limited or restrict I'd, particularly more limited or restricted
than during the period of partnership ownership of the entire
property, it was his duty to so disclose by incorporating any
such limitlltions in the grant itself, rather than some four years
after thc dissolution, and after continuing use of the right of
way as granted, seeking court assistance to prevent defendant
frolll milking full use in the customary manner of the way
granted.
[6] Easements - Creation - Express Grant - Construction.-The
rules applicable to the construction of deeds generally, such
as that a grant is to be interpreted in favor of the grantee and
a reservation in the grant is to be interpreted in favor of the
grantor (Civ. Code, § 1069), apply with full force and effect
[6] See Cal.Jur.2d, Easements, § 10.
53 C.2d-17
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to instruments conveying easements or similar rights or
privileges.
[7] Deeds-Evidence-Parol Evidence.--If the language of a deed
is plain, certain and unambiguous, neither parol evidence nor
surrounding facts and circumstances will be considered to add
to, detract from, or vary its terms or to determine the estate
conveyed.
[8] Easements - Creation - Express Grant-Construction.-Any
uncertainty in a grant to grantees "as Joint Tenants" did not
apply to the property conveyed, where it was described as "A
right of way over a road as presently constructed along the
East Branch of Sand Creek, in the East half of Section 18" etc.
[9] Contracts - Interpretation - Construction in Favor of One
Party.-An instrument in writing is construed most strongly
against the party who drafted it or caused it to be drafted.
(Civ. Code, § 1654.)
[10] Easements-Mode and Extent of User-Construction of Grant.
-Where it was the intention of the parties, on dissolving a
partnership, to make a substantially equal division, of the range
property and equipment which they owned as partners, and
plaintiff's own testimony further showed that following the
toss of a coin-which gave him the northern portion of the
property-defendant requested two further rights of way
in addition to the existing one from the northern to the southern portion, that the parties argued out the matter including
use for deer hunting, and that plaintiff caused the deed to the
right of way to be prepared in the form it was, which contained
no limitation as to either purpose or use by defendant, if under
such circumstances plaintiff had intended (and the partners had
agreed) that defendant himself, and hunters invited or licensed
by defendant, were to be barred from use of the existing right
of way, it was incumbent on plaintiff to have caused the deed
he prepared and delivered to so state. In any event, the prior
negotiations which preceded the written document were merged
into and superseded by the writing, and could not be resorted to
by plaintiff to so limit the tenns of the grant as to deprive
his fonner partner of the right to continue using the road as
it had been used consistently before dissolution of the partnership.
[11] ld.-Mode and Extent of User-Construction of Grant.-A
grant in general terms of an easement of way will ordinarily
be construed as creating a general right of way capable of use
in connection with the dominant tenement for all reasonable
purposes.
[12] ld. - Mode and Extent of User - Construction of Grant. - A
grant of a right of way unrestricted as to purpose is a grant
of a way to be used for any purpose.
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APPEAL from portion of a judgment of the Superior Court
of Colusa County. Wright L. Callender, Judge.- Reversed.
Action involving the extent of a grant of right of way by a
deed from plaintiffs to defendants. Portion of judgment enjoining defendant's use of the right of way other than as
limited bY.the judgment, reversed.
Ralph W. Rutledge and Richard E. Patton for Appellants.
Donald W. Littlejohn and Florence J. Westfall for Respondents.

)

SCHAUER, J.-This is an appeal by defendants from only
that portion of a judgment which purports to alter the terms
of, and place limits on the use of a right of way granted by,
a deed to them from plaintiffs, and which enjoins use of the
right of way other than as limited by the judgment. We have
concluded that the trial court's judgment results in varying
the terms of the written grant, rather than merely interpreting
it, and is without support in the record, and that the portion of
the judgment appealed from should therefore be reversed. For
convenience, plaintiff husband and defendant husband will
hereinafter sometimes be referred to as plaintiff and defendant, respectively.
In August, 1947, plaintiff and defendant acquired a.<; partners certain range land in Colusa County, California. Plaintiff testified that during the deer hunting seasons of 1947
through 1951, the parties and their invitees and guests hunted
deer upon the range land. For the season of 1949 or 1950 they
leased out the deer llUnting rights, such leasing being referred
to as "commercial hunting"; plaintiff and defendant, however, reserved the right to also hunt on the property with their
own guests. Plaintiff did not know "how many permits or
licenses" to hunt were sold by the lessee in that year.
Until 1952 the parties owned and "farmed or operated this
property as partners. " In that year by agreement the partnership was dissolved and the land divided into two parcels. As
above shown, for five or six years preceding dissolution of the
partnership both parcels had been used seasonally for deer
hunting and the road which is the subject of the right of way
here disputed had been used by the partners and their guests
or licensees. (Likewise, as hereinafter shown, both parcels• .Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council.
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and the deeded right of way over the road-continued to be
used for deer hunting for some four years after the dissolution.) It was (at least inferentially) mutually intended that
the two parcels should be substantially equal; i.e., that thedivision should be reasonably fair to each equal partner; and
it was agreed that the flip of a coin would determine which
portion each partner should receive. As partners, as hereinafter discussed in more detail, the parties were in a fiduciary
relationship and each owed to the other the highest good faith
and fairness. Plaintiff won the toss and chose the northerly
parcel; defendant thereby received the southerly part, also
known as the" back half of the range" or the" brush patch."
For many years there had been a private road (the road
hereinabove mentioned) crossing the northerly portion which
road ,vas used as a means of access to the southerly portion
and which at the time of the division of the land was the only
road into the back part of the latter portion, although there
were" other ways to get into the place. " Prior to the division,
and as a part of the dissolution agreement pertaining to
equalization of value and accessibility of each parcel, the partners agreed that "whoever got" this back half, or "southerly
parcel, " of the range, should also receive and have a right of
way across the northerly parcel over the private access road.
As a part of the theretofore orally agreed upon division defendant, to whom the back (southerly) part went, received
from plaintiff a grant deed to c. all the real property ... described as follows:
•• A right of way over a road as presently constructed along
the East Branch of Sand Creek, in the [legal description]."
Plaintiff, himself, prepared the deed following oral diseussions
,vith his partner. No limitation as to either purpose or use
by defendant, of the right of way so conveyed is stated in the
deed.
Following the partition in 1952, plaintiff and defendant and
their iuvitees and guests hunted upon each other's land as
well as upon their own during the deer season of that year.
In 1953, however, a boundary fence was erected and thereafter each party hunted only upon his own lands. During the
1953 through 1955 se-asons defendant and his invite-es and
guests, apparcntly as had been contemplated by the parties
at the time of partition, used the right of way over the road
al'ross plaintiff's land to reach the land of defendant. In 1956
both defendant and plaintiff leased "exclusive" deer hunting
.rights "commercially" on their respective lands to individual
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lessees. The lessee of defendant's land "sold memberships"
for hunting purposes and, pursuant to instructions by defendant, told the deer hunters that they were to use the right
of way to reach the land. Inferribly it was at this time that
plaintiff became dissatisfied with defendant's use of the right
of way. He thereupon (some four years after the partnership
dissolution and division of the property) brought this suit,
alleging that the right of way was granted "for the sole purpose of the use of the defendants to reach their property, and
also for ... driving and hauling cattle and feed across said
right-of-way to reach defendants' property," and seeking to
limit its use accordingly.
Althou2h as hereinabove mentioned the defendants appeal
from only that portion of the judgment which purports to
limit the extent of the granted right of way, it makes for a
clearer understanding of the case to briefly mention other
issues that were tried and resolved. The :first cause of action
alleged: "That on or about the 29th day of August, 1952, the
plaintiffs executed and delivered to the defendants a rightof-way as follows, to wit: For Value Received, Adolph D.
Laux and Joyce H. Laux, his wife, grant to William J. Freed
and Bertell F. Freed, his wife, as Joint Tenants, all the real
property situate in the County of Colusa, State of California,
described as follows: A right of. way over a road as presently
constructed along the East Branch of Sand Creek, in the East
half of Section 18 ... That pursuant to the provisions of said
right-of-way defendants were entitled to use said road only
as constructed and existing as of August 29, 1952." Plaintiffs
further alleged that after the partition of the property and
the delivery of the respective deeds from defendants to plaintiffs and from plaintiffs to defendants the defendants "changed
the course of said road from its original location of 1952 as it
was constructed when the said right-of-way was granted, " and
that defendants "constructed a bridge over an excavation
made by the defendants" and changed the course of the stream.
Plaintiffs also alleged that in 1956 the defendants commenced
the construction of another bridge to replace the previous one
which had been washed out and in process of reconstruction
of the bridge took materials from plaintiffs' land.
Plaintiffs in their second cause of action alleged the granting
of the right of way and the terms hereinabove quoted and
further averred: "That the said right-of-way hereinabove
described grant.ed by the plaintiffs to the defendants was
granted for the sole purpose of the use of the defendants to

)
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reach their property, and also for the purpose of the defendants driving and hauling cattle and feed acro:~s said rightof-way to reach defendants' property. Tkat in the year 1956,
tke defendants leased their aforesaid described real property
for deer hunting purposes during the deer hunting season of
1956 j that the lessee of the hunting privileges of said premises
has and is issuing memberships to numerous indh'iduals for
the purpose of hunting on the defendants' aforedescribed
property. That the plaintiffs in the ycar 1956 leased their
aforedescribed premises for hunting during the deer season of
1956." (Italics added.) Plaintiffs further alleged tkat at the
point the right of way commences on plaintiff's land they
erected a gate and locked it with a ckain and lock, delivering
to defendants a key for the purpose of entry. "That since the
commencement of deer hunting season in the year 1956, and
pursuant to the specific instructions of the defendants, a large
number of people who have purchased hunting rights on defendants' land are entering plaintiffs' land over the aforesaid
right-of-way granted to the defendants; that plaintiffs have
requested the defendants to cease delivering said keys to said
deer hunters and that defendants instruct said deer hunters
not to cross plaintiffs' land j but defendants ... fail and refuse,
to do so; that said hunters are entering the land of the plaintiffs at the instruction of the defendants; (tkat tke entry of
.aid hunters upon plaintiffs' land is not for the primary purpose of gaining access to the defendants' land, but for the purpose of hunting on plaintiffs' land enroute to the defendants'
land.l1 1 ) • • • Tkat tke p1·esent use of said premises by the
lessees of the defendants' is an unauthorized change of burde11
of the easement and is harmful to tke plaintiffs' in tkat it has
disrupted the hunting of the plaintiffs' lessee; that plaintiffs'
lessee threatens to cancel his lease because of the use 0/ the
right-o/-way by defendants' hunters." (Italics added.)
The trial court found that prior to the year 1952 plaintiffs
and defendants jointly owned all of the real property concerned in this litigation j "that in the year 1952 Plaintiffs
Laux and Defendants Freed [by mutual agreement] partitioned said property, Plaintiffs Laux [by the toss of a coin]
becoming the owners of the land" referred to by the parties
as the northerly parcel and defendants Freed becoming the
owners of the southerly part, or "brush patch. " To effect such
1The record ahows that on motion of plaintiffs this elause in parentheses was stricken from plaintiffs' eopy; but it remaina as a faet
averred under oath for sipmeanee in understanding .the issues here.
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conveyance each of the parties delivered to the other a deed
conveying the grantors' respective interests. In addition to
the deed from plaintiffs to defendants conveying the southerly
portion the court found that plaintiffs conveyed to defendants
a right of way in the language hereinabpve quoted.
As to the issues specifically presented by the pleadings the
findings were as follows: ., That the words •as presently constructed' appearing in the above mentioned grant of right of
way is hereby construed to refer to the direction and location
of the right of way, and said words do not negative a secondary
easement to maintain or repair"; that the defendants did
not change the course or location of the road upon "said right
of way from its original location in 1952 as said road was located when the said right of way was granted"; that the defendants did construct a bridge in the fall of 1953 which was
washed out in 1955, and in 1956 defendants commenced construction of a new bridge which new bridge is improperly
constructed so that the bridge itself and its approaches are
hazardous. Purporting to support the specific provision of
the judgment from which the appeal is taken the court found
that the right of way in the language hereinabove quoted "was
granted for the sole purpose of the use by Defendants Freed
for moving livestock, farm machinery, hay, feed, other stock
raising and farm goods and chattels to and from their property
lying south of Plaintiffs' property. (6) That in the year 1956,
the Defendants Freed leased their aforementioned described
real property for deer hunting purposes during the deer
hunting season of 1956; that the Lessee of the hunting privileges of said premises issued memberships to numerous individuals for the purpose of hunting on Defendants' hereinabove
described property; that since the commencement of deer
season in 1956, and pursuant to the specific instructions of
Defendants Freed and their Lessee. said deer hunters, who had
purchased hunting rights on Defendants' land, entered Plaintiffs' land over the aforementioned right of way granted to
the defendants; that Plaintiffs requested Defendants to cease
instructing said deer hunters to use such access to Defendants' property j that Defendants failed and refused to permit
said deer hunters to use any other access to Defendants' property and hunting area. (7) A map in evidence shows that Defendants have access to their property and hunting area by a
county road and should they desire to rent hunting privileges
to third persons, access to said hunting area can be gained by
the above mentioned road. (8) That the use of Defendants'
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private right of way over Plaintiffs' property by deer hunters
has unreasonably increased the burden on the servient tene
ment; that such lise was not contemplated by the parties at
the time of the original grant and that such grant was made
for the sole purpose of permi!ting Defendants to move livestock, feed, machinery and stock raising and other farm goods
and chattels to and from the county road across Plaintiffs'
land to that of the Defendants. (9) That the use of said right
of way by the Defendants, their lessee, and third persons, for
purposes other than moving livestock, feed, machinery, stock
raising and other farm goods and chattels to and from the
county road across Plaintiffs' land to that of the Defendants,
is an unauthorized change in the burden of the easement of
said right of way." (Italics added.)
Based on the foregoing findings the judgment enjoins the
defendants from maintaining or constructing the bridge referred to in the first cause of action unless the same "be built
under the supervision ... of an experienced bridge builder ...
or ... under the supervision of the [county] Road Commissioner," and specifies that H by way of an injunction . .. Defendants are ... enjoined ... from use or permitting to be used
the right of way granted for the purpose of ingress and egress
to and from their property for commercial hunting privileges
and that the use of the road is hereby limited to the purposes
of permitting Defendants to move livestock, farm machinery,
hay, feed and other stock raising and farming goods and
chattels to and fram their own property." It is to be observed
that this injunction absolutely prohibits the defendants (either
in person or by their invitees) from using the granted right of
way for any purpose not listed in the judgment. Thus defendants are deprived of a use which had been an incident of the
right of way road for approximately 10 years: from 1947 to
1952, before the partition; and from 1952 to 1956, after partition.
The controlling issue before us is whether the last-quoted
portion of the injunction so limiting the defendants in the
use and enjoyment of their easement, can be sustained.
[ 1 ] In the first place it is to be noted that section 1104
of the Civil Code provides that "A transfer of real property
passes all easements attached thereto, and creates in favor
thereof an easement to use other real property of the person
whose estate is transferred in the same manner and to the
same extent as such property was obviously and permanently
used by the person whose estate is transferred, for the benefit

)

Jan. 1960]

LAUX t!. FREED
(53 C.2d 512: 2 Cal.Rotr. 265. 348 P.2d 873]

521

t.hereof, at the time when the transfer was agreed upon or
completed." (See also Civ. Code, §§ 801, 806; Rest., Property,
§ 483, pp. 3018-3019.) The long-established principle embodied
in this section and its application are not limited to the list
of servitudes and corresponding easements enumerated in
section 801 of the Civil Code, for the reason that the easements
encomp8.!!Sed within the provisions of section 1104 "embrace
every burden which by virtue of the manner of use has been
imposed upon the portion of the estate not granted in favor
of the portion granted." (Jersey Farm 00. v. Atlanta Realty
00. (1912), 164 Cal. 412, 415 [129 P. 593] ; see also Rosebrook
v. Utz (1941),45 Cal.App.2d 726, 729 [114 P.2d 715].) Here,
we need not concern ourselves with any question as to whether,
technically, an easement would attach from the use of the right
of way over the road during the period of partnership ownership. The significant fact is that the road was so used by the
partners and their invitees and it was agreed between the
fiduciaries that the one who drew the "brush patch" (southerly
portion) should have the right of way along the road over the
northerly portion.
[2] Here, although plaintiff, in support of the findings
and the judgment, relies upon his own testimony that prior
to partition of the land the parties, then being partners, orally
discussed and agreed that the right of way would be for the
limited purposes alleged by plaintiff and found by the trial
court, plaintiff's testimony, undisputed in this respect, shows
affirmatively that from the time the parties as partners first
acquired the land until they divided it by the flip of a coin
some five years later and erected a boundary fence the following year, both plaintiff and defendant and their invitees and
guests had hunted the entire range land and during a portion
of that time had jointly leased out the deer hunting rights on
a commercial basis. 2 Until plaintiff partner won the toss of
the coin and knew which of the two parcels into which the land
had been divided would be his, his interest was, of course, that
the party who received the back half or "brush patch" should
likewise receive an unlimited right of way-at least to the
extent and for the purposes for which it had been used during
'Plaintiff testified that during the period he owned the property
jointly with defendant there was "commercial hunting done on the
premises ••• it was the summer of either '49 or 'GO . . • • [T]he range
land was leased out in one of those years to Mr. Al Lawrence"; that
plaintiff did not "know how many permits or lieen~es tlwt Mr. Lawrence
Bold in the year that he had the commercial hunting rights on the range."
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partnership ownership--over the private access road here in
dispute. His true complaint seems now to be that" these people
coming across interfered with the hunting on" his own parcel
after the partition, and for that reason he tardily seeks to have
a court write into the deed which he had prepared limitations
on the use of his former partner which he asserts were discussed but which were omitted from the deed. Under such
circumstances we believe that the provisions of section 1104
of the Civil Code should apply in favor of defendant to the
end that he be permitted to continue the full use of the'right
of way in the manner it was used before partition of the
property.
[3] Manifestly, as partners in the ownership and operation of the entire property before it was divided, plaintiff and
defendant bore a confidential and fiduciary relationship to
each other. (Nelson v. Abraham (1947), 29 Cal.2d 745, 750
[6] [177 P.2d931]; 37 Cal.Jur.2d 613-614, § 46, and cases
there cited; 68 C.J.S. 516-517, §76; 40 Am.Jur. 217, §128.)
As partners, neither had the right to take an unfair advantage
or secure an undue benefit, and the burden is on the one seeking an advantage to show complete good faith and fairness
toward the other. [4] The duty of good faith and the
burden of showing it extend to the dissolution and liquidation
of partnership affairs, as well as to the sale by one partner
to another of his interest in the partnership. (Arnold v.
Arnold (1902), 137 Cal. 291, 296 [70 P. 23]; see also 37
Cal.Jur.2d 619-621, § 51; 40 Am.Jur. 218, § 129.) [5] It
follows that if plaintiff, who drafted the right of way deed in
the present case, intended that use of such right of way be
limited or restricted, particularly more limited or restricted
than during the period of partnership ownership of the entire
property, it was his duty to so disclose by incorporating any
such limitations in the grant itself, rather than some four years
after the dissolution, aud after continuing use of the right of
way as granted, seeking court assistance to prevent defendant
from making full use in the customary manner of the way
granted.
[6] Insofar as construction of the grant of the right of
way is concerned section 1069 of the Civil Code declares that
"A grant is to be interpreted in favor of the grantee, except
that a reservation in any grant ... is to be interpreted in favor
of the grantor." "[T] he rules applicable to the construction
of deeds generally apply with full force and effect to instruments conveying easements or other similar rights or privi-
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leges." (Eastman v. Piper (1924), 68 Cal.App. 554, 561 [6]
[229 P. 1002] ; 17 Cal.Jur.2d 102, § 10.)
[7] One of such rules is that if the language of a deed is
plain, certain and unambiguous, neither parol evidence nor
surrounding facts and circumstances will be con:,idcred to add
to, detract from, or vary its terms or to determine the estate
conveyed. (See Joerger v. Pacific Gas &; Electric Co. (1929),
207 Cal. 8, 32 [26] [276 P. 1017] ; Fitzgerald v. County of
Modoc (1913), 164 Cal. 493, 497 [129 P. 794,44 L.R.A. N.S.
1229] ; Pinsky v. Sloat (1955), 130 Cal.App.2d 579, 588-58!)
[3-11J [279 P.2d 584] ; Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1856, 1860; 13
Cal.Jur.2d 521-522, § 122, 18 Cal.Jur.2d 737-738, § 255; id.
768-770, § 278.) Smith v. Worn (1892),93 Cal. 206, 214 [28
P. 944J, relied upon by plaintiff, in which evidence of surrounding circumstances was considered by the court, involved
construction of the very language used in the deed conveying
the right of way, to determine whether it might be obstructed
by gates or bars, and is not persuasive to the contrary of the
conclusion we have stated.
[8] There appears to be nothing unclear, uncertain or
ambiguous, at least as relevant to the issues of this case, in
the words "For Value Received, Adolph D. Laux and Joyce
H. Laux ... grant to William J. Freed and Bertell F. Freed
" . as Joint Tenants, all the real property situate in the County
of Colusa ... described as follows: A right of way over a road
as presently constructed along the East Branch of Sand Creek,
in the East half of Section 18" etc. Perhaps one might argue
ambiguity or uncertainty as to the meaning of "as Joint
Tenants" but that criticism does not apply to "A right of way
over a road as presently constructed along the East Branch of
Sand Creek" etc. But even if we assume that in some situations the facts surrounding the execution of the deed may be
shown in evidence to explain the language used in a deed, that
is not the purpose or objective of the plaintiffs here.
There is not even a suggestion of overreaching of plaintiffs
by defendants. Nor is there any contention that defendants
misled plaintiffs or misrepresented the terms of the dissolution
of the partnership. Plaintiff Adolph Laux himself prepared
the deed. He prepared it, according to his testimony, after discussion with defendant William Freed of various requests for
further and differing rights of way.
Section 1066 of the Civil Code specifies that "Grants are
to be interpreted in like manner with contracts in general,
except so far as is otherwise provided in this article." (Sec-
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tions 1066 through 1072 constitute "this article.") Section
1625 provides, "The execution of a contract in writing,
whether the law requires it to he written or not, supersedes
all the negotiations or stipulatioJls concerning its matter ",hidl
preceded or accompanied the execution of the instrument."
[9] Further, an instrument in writ.ing is construed most
strongly against the party who drafted it or caused it to he
drafted. (Civ. Code, § 1654; Taylor v. J. B. Hill Co. (1948),
31 Cal.2d 373, 374 [1] [189 P.2d 258]; Estate of Rule (1944),
25 Ca1.2d 1, 13 [8] [152 P.2d 1003, 155 A.L.R. 1319] ; 12 Cal.
Jur.2d 363.) [10] Plaintiff's own testimony here shows
that the intention of the parties was to make (and the law
prescribing the duties of fiduciaries would require) a substantially equal division of the property and equipment which
they owned as partners, that following the toss of the coin
defendant had requested two further rights of way in addition to the existing one and that the parties had negotiated
and argued out the matter including use for deer hunting,
and that plaintiff caused t~e deed to the right of way to be
prepared in the form hereinabove quoted and deposited witb
the title company.3 If plaintiff had intended (and the partners
had agreed) that defenuant himself, and hunters invited or
licensed by defendant, were to be barred from use of the
existing right of way-the sole right of way granted by plaintiff to defendant-it was incumbent on the plaintiff to have
caused the deed he prepared and delivered to so state. In any
event, under the circumstances shown here, the prior negotiations which preceded the written oot'ument were merged into
and superseded by the writing, and cannot now be resorted to
by plaintiff to so limit the terms of the grant as to deprive
his former partner of the right to continue using the road as
it had been used consistently before the dissolution of the partnership.
This conclusion is further supported by the provision of
'Plaintiff testi1ied that before the right of way deed was finally prepared and delivered to defendant. he Rnd defendant hlld three or four
conversations concerning the matter; that defendant told plaintiff "that
the present road wasn't going to be adequate flnougb . . . to transport
the hunters across my property to get to tIl(' rjdges on top . . . on his
part of the range" (italics added): defendant wanted "three rights
of way • • . He wanted first the right of way as was then existing • . •
And he also wanted one that went around the Ble\'jns bouse .•• To
the east of the house. [And] He wllnted another one that went over
the hill on the west" but plaintiff "told him no." Plaintiff himself
"went into Ed Barrell's office and drew up tlle right of wily ••• Q. And
the deed to the right of way was also plnced by :rou with the title company. is that right! A. Yes."

Jan. 1960]

LAUX

v.

FREED

525

[53 C.2d 512: !! Cal.Rotr. 265. 348 P.2d 8731

8rction 806 of the Civil Codc that" The extent of a servitude is
determined by the terms of the grant, or the nature of the
enjoyment by which it was acquired. " [ 11] And in Tiffany,
Real Propr]"ty, volume 3 (3d ed.), section 803, pages 322-323,
it is said: "A grant in general terms of an easement of way
will onlinarily be construed as creating a general right of way
eapable of use in eonnection with the dominant tenement for
a II rel1>;0118 ble purposes.... " [ 12 ] Also, in Thompson on
Heal Proprrty, volume 2 (Perm. ed.), sections 577-578, pages
183-] 86, thc rule is stated as follows: "A grant of a right of
way unrestricted as to purpose is a grant of a way to be used
for any purpose whatever.... " (See also 38 Cal.L.Rev. 444;
28 C ..J .S. 767-768, § 87; id. 769, § 90; 17A Am.Jur. 727-729,
§ 119: Drexler v. Hufnagel (1946), 76 Cal.App.2d 606, 60!)
[173 P.2d 677].) We conclude that the record does not support the limitations imposed by injunction on the right of
way granted to defendants.
For the above stated reasons, we conclude that the record
fails to. provide a legally sufficient basis for judicially writing
into plaintiffs' deed of an unlimited right of way, the restrictions embodied in the injunction.
The portions of the judgment appealed from are reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Spence, J., McComb, J., Peters, J., and
Whit!', .L, concurred.
TRA Y~On, J.-I concur in the judgment but wish to add
that I adhere to the views with respect to the so-called rule
against admitting extrinsic evidence to interpret apparently
ul\amlliguous written instruments set forth in my concurring
opiuion ill U11iversal Sales Corp. v. California etc. Mfg. Co.,
20 Cal.2d 75], 776 [128 P.2d 665], and dissenting opinion in
Esfate of Rule, 25 Ca1.2d 1, 20-22 r152 P.2d 1003, 155 A.L.R.
13Hl]. (Sl'e also Union Oil Co. v. Union Sugar Co., 31 Ca1.2d
300, 30G, footnote [188 P.2d 470].) Its fatuity is demonstrated b~' holdings that the conflicting contentions of the
partirs as to the meaning of a written instrument alone supply
the mnhigllity necessary to take the rule out of play. (Beneficial eic. IllS. Co. v. Kurt Hitke &- Co., 46 Ca1.2d 517, 524
[2n7 P.2d 428] ; Chagtain v. Belmont, 43 Ca1.2d 45, 51 [271
P.2d 498); Televis1'oll A"is Productions, Inc. v. Jerry Fairbanl;s, Inc., 164 Ca1.App.2d R42, 848 [331 P.2d 117] ; California E111p. efc. Com. v. Waltf1"S, H4 Cal.App.2d 554, 559 [14!)
P.2d 17).) IJitigatioll as to the meaning of language arises

526

LAUX

1).

FREED

[53 C.2d

only from disputes as to meaning; a rule applicable only when
no dispute exists is of no assistance in resolving a dispute
that does exist.
The rule is of no assistance whatever in determining the
meaning of the deed in this case. Its meaning can only be made
plain by extrinsic evidence. . Certainly it is logic run riot to
rely on extrinsic evidence to establish that the meaning is plain
and then to hold that such evidence cannot be considered
because the meaning is plain. The suitability of defendants'
land for deer hunting was established by the extrinsic evidence
of its use for that purpose both before and after the execution
of the deed in question. In the absence of evidence establishing that the meaning the parties attached to the language of
the grant excluded use of the easement to gain access for hunting, the grant in general terms must be interpreted as permitting that use. (Drexler v. Hufnagel, 76 Cal.App.2d 606,
609 [173 P.2d 677] ; see Pasadena v. California-Michigan etc.
Co., 17 Ca1.2d 576, 582 [110 P.2d 983, 133 A.L.R. 1186];
3 Tiffany, Real Property (3d ed.), § 803, pp. 322-323.)
There is no evidence in the record .to support a restrictive
interpretation of the deed. It is true that plaintiff testified
that before the property was partitioned, the parties orally
agreed that "whoever got the back half of the range should
have a right of way up through the property for the purpose
of caring for his cattle in winter time, or hauling hay up to
them, or haul material, whatever he needed to care for his
property, in maintaining fences, and so forth." As an agreement, this oral understanding was superseded by the subsequently executed deed. (Civ. Code, § 1625; Hotle v. Millet·,
51 Ca1.2d 541,546 [344 P.2d 849] ; see 3 Corbin on Contracts,
§ 574, pp. 222-223.) As extrinsic evidence of the meaning of
the deed, it does not support the trial court's interpretation.
Thus, the oral understanding did not expressly exclude access
for deer hunting, and other testimony of plaintiff establishes
that the parties were not in 8.","'I"eement as to the scope of the
easement intended immediately before the deed was executed.
At that time defendant wished additional rights of way to
facilitate hunting, and plaintiff wished to prohibit use of the
right of way by hunters altogether. This controversy was resolved when the parties completed the dissolution of their
partnership by the execution and acceptance of the deed granting the right of way. Under these circumstances the deed
cannot reasonably be interpreted as prohibiting access to defendants' land for deer hunting, an existing and reasonable
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use of the land. In view of the controversy, had the parties
agreed on a more restrictive use, surely they would have
adopted language so providing.
To attempt to support this conclusion by holding that the
very evidence on which it is based may not be considered is
logically indefensible. Moreover, the giving of lip service to
the rule that an apparently plain and unambiguous meaning
must govern, invites the error that the trial court committed
in this case, namely, rewriting a written instrument. Implicit
in the statement that when the language of a written instrument is "plain, certain and unambiguous" extrinsic evidence
will not be considered "to add to, detract from, or vary its
terms" is the idea that if the language is not "plain, certain
and unambiguous," extrinsic evidence may be considered for
those purposes. Whether or not the language of a written
instrument appears, "plain, certain and unambiguous," extrinsic evidence is not admissible to· "add to, detract from, or
vary its terms." It is admissible to determine what those
terms are. (Barham v. Barham, 33 Ca1.2d 416, 422-423 [202
P.2d 289].) The court must determine the true meaning of
the instrument in the light of the evidence available. It can
neither exclude extrinsic evidence relevant to that determination nor invoke such evidence to write a new or different
instrument.
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